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A B S T R A C T
Although international nonmarket strategy research has highlighted the importance of political
ties, it is still unclear why some foreign subsidiaries are more politically active than others and
what conditions may render political practices beneﬁcial in a host country. We argue that foreign
subsidiary political tie intensity—the extent to which senior managers provide time and re-
sources in informally dealing with government oﬃcials for nonmarket purposes—will be inﬂu-
enced by political institutions in their parent's home country, especially when the MNE parent
attempts to protect foreign subsidiary resources. Additionally, we assert that ﬁt between a par-
ent's home country political institutions and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity will posi-
tively aﬀect subsidiary performance. We employ primary data collected from 181 foreign sub-
sidiaries in the Philippines and ﬁnd support for our hypotheses. This study advances international
nonmarket strategy research by highlighting how an MNE's home country political institutions
shape subsidiary political networking and strategic performance outcomes in host country en-
vironments.
1. Introduction
Nonmarket strategy literature has generally asserted that ﬁrms may become politically active for the purpose of obtaining fa-
vorable public policy within their operating environment (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Liedong et al., 2015).
Similarly, international business scholars have argued that a primary way to mitigate regulatory uncertainty and gain a strategic
advantage in foreign environments is to cultivate political ties with key host country government actors (Acquaah, 2007; Lawton
et al., 2012; Park and Luo, 2001). However, the limited number of empirical studies on the eﬀectiveness of political ties “show
inconsistent results, ranging from a negative to a positive eﬀect on performance, including no eﬀect at all” (Puck et al., 2013: 1022).
Consequently, it is still unclear why some foreign subsidiaries are more politically active than others and what conditions may render
such activity beneﬁcial to subsidiary competitive advantage in a host country (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Teng et al., 2017).
Mellahi et al. (2016) have argued that there is a need to move the conversation forward by investigating how heterogeneity of
managerial decisions inﬂuences nonmarket strategy and subsequently, ﬁrm performance. Importantly, although the international
nonmarket strategy literature has indicated home country institutions as possible drivers of heterogeneity in MNE political behavior
in foreign markets (e.g., White et al., 2014), little is known concerning how MNE political activities, and their eﬃcacy, are shaped by
institutional diﬀerences across jurisdictions (Doh et al., 2012: 27; Liedong et al., 2015). In this study, we attempt to address these
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important gaps pertaining to the drivers and consequences of political tie activity and, in doing so, advance the international non-
market strategy literature.
Drawing from neoinstitutional theory (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; North, 1990), we posit that foreign subsidiary political tie
intensity—the extent to which senior managers invest time and resources in informally dealing with government oﬃcials for non-
market purposes (Danis et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2010; White et al., 2015)—will be partially formed based on the current political
institutions within its home country (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). In essence, the MNE's adaptation to its home country political
institutions (i.e., external isomorphism) will lead to strategic practices being institutionalized and transferred to foreign subsidiaries
within the MNE (i.e., intra-MNE isomorphism) through people and processes, which ultimately aﬀects political networking practices
in host country environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Gamble, 2010; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Kostova, 1999; Kostova et al.,
2008). Moreover, we suggest that the extent to which a parent MNE attempts to protect investment in foreign subsidiary resources
strengthens the foreign subsidiary's integration with the parent ﬁrm, thereby enhancing intra-MNE isomorphism and thus the eﬀect of
the current home country political environment on foreign subsidiary allocation of managerial eﬀorts towards intensifying political
ties in a host country.
At the same time, we also consider that managers of foreign subsidiaries have agency in shaping the subsidiary's nonmarket
strategy. Mellahi et al. (2016: 12) have suggested that foreign subsidiaries may abandon their parent ﬁrm's “established nonmarket
practices in order to adapt to the host country's institutional norms or they may employ ceremonial adaption without changing actual
practices. Unfortunately … no study [has] explicitly tested the performance impact of such strategies.” We oﬀer novel insights
concerning this issue by drawing from the ﬁt paradigm, which suggests that subsidiary performance outcomes may be aﬀected by ﬁt
between an MNE parent's capabilities, developed as a means to successfully deal with home country institutions, and foreign sub-
sidiary strategic practices abroad (Brouthers et al., 2003; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; White et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally, we posit
that foreign subsidiaries who allocate managerial eﬀorts towards political networking at a level that ﬁts their home country political
institutions are better positioned to leverage political capabilities and will thus tend to perform better.
Taken together, we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) how will political institutions of an MNE parent's home
country drive foreign subsidiary political tie intensity? and (2) how will the ﬁt between parent home country political institutions and
foreign subsidiary political tie intensity inﬂuence strategic performance in a host country environment? In attempting to address
these questions, our study contributes to the international nonmarket strategy literature in several important ways. First, we leverage
neoinstitutional theorization, a relatively novel approach within international nonmarket strategy research (Lux et al., 2011), to
explicate how parent home country political institutions can drive heterogeneity in foreign subsidiary political tie intensity. We ﬁnd
that foreign subsidiaries from more politically stable home countries allocate greater eﬀort towards the intensiﬁcation of political
ties, especially when MNE parents exert higher levels of protection over resources being committed to foreign subsidiary operations.
Past research has largely focused on how host country institutions (e.g., Luo, 2001; Sun et al., 2010; Doh et al., 2012), rather than
home country institutions, drive foreign subsidiary political tie intensity. Hence, by responding to Mellahi et al.'s (2016) call, we
advance understanding of the antecedents of managerial decision heterogeneity related to foreign subsidiary political activities.
Second, we develop a more nuanced conceptualization of the consequences of political ties, making an important step towards
untangling equivocal results in past studies. Speciﬁcally, “ﬁt” between a parent's home country political institutions and foreign
subsidiary political tie intensity in a host country has yet to be considered as a factor altering the value of political ties. We theorize
and ﬁnd that ﬁt will have a positive eﬀect on subsidiary strategic performance. In doing so, our study enriches the international
nonmarket strategy literature by oﬀering that ﬁt with not only host country but also home country political institutions may act as a
contingency to the eﬃcacy of political ties in a host country.
Finally, our study makes important empirical contributions to the literature. Lux et al. (2011: 242) lamented that the diﬃculty in
gathering primary data on nonmarket strategy “contribute[s] to the lack of stronger support for current theoretical perspectives”. We
overcome this obstacle by testing our hypotheses with primary data collected from 181 foreign subsidiaries in the Philippines.
Furthermore, most research on political ties in emerging markets has been primarily focused on politically stable contexts, such as
with the Chinese Communist Party (e.g., Li and Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2009; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000; Sun et al.,
2010), while studies in emerging markets with volatile political environments remain scarce. The Philippines is characterized by a
revolving door of elected politicians belonging to a multitude of political parties (De Dios, 2008), which allows us to extend the
international nonmarket strategy literature into new contexts and thus promote a more accurate understanding of the consequences
of these important managerial activities. Fig. 1 shows the conceptual model depicting the hypothesized relationships considered in
our study.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Home country political institutions and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity
A small body of empirical research in the international nonmarket strategy literature has investigated what factors inﬂuence the
development and utilization of political ties in foreign markets. For example, Park and Luo (2001) found that strategic orientation
(i.e., level of market eﬀectiveness from strategic decisions) and non-state-owned ﬁrms had a positive inﬂuence, while manufacturing
oriented industries and industry growth rate had a negative inﬂuence on the development of political ties with government au-
thorities. Similarly, Luo and Zhao (2009) found that regulatory distance and industry uncertainty had a positive inﬂuence, while
industry accessibility and economic development had a negative inﬂuence on the utilization of foreign subsidiary relational political
strategies. Furthermore, White et al. (2015) found that there was a relationship between foreign subsidiary managerial perceptions of
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host country legal system uncertainty and the intensiﬁcation of political ties.
Importantly, prior studies often highlight the role of host country political institutions as drivers of political activities by foreign
subsidiaries. However, they have overlooked the role of MNE parent home country political institutions and the transference of
political practices to foreign subsidiaries (Lawton et al., 2012). This is an important deﬁciency in the extant literature because “both
country of origin and host country practices [are] likely to be found in MNCs overseas subsidiaries.” (Gamble, 2010: 722). We suggest
that home country political stability, a key dimension of a country's governance system, will help shape foreign subsidiary allocation
of managerial eﬀorts towards political networking. Political stability refers to the likelihood of sudden changes in country's political
authority (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Countries diﬀer in their political systems and, more speciﬁcally, in the extent to which political
regimes tend to be volatile and uncertain. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008, p. 964) have oﬀered an example of an environment with
high political instability when discussing how a crisis in Argentina during 2001 led to a change in the government “three times in two
weeks”. While this may be considered as an extreme example of political instability, this point illustrates that sudden changes in
political authority can disrupt policies established to govern economic activity (Kobrin, 1979).
Political instability in a parent's home country can inﬂuence an MNE's allocation of organizational resources towards intensifying
political ties, as a means to mitigate policy risk and uncertainty, by undermining the strategic beneﬁts of establishing political
networks. For example, changes in political leadership in a home country may render organizations with intensive political networks
“victims of discrimination, resource exclusion, and occasional expropriation and sabotage between rival [political] networks”
(Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012, p. 72) when they are associated with political actors who have lost power (Sun et al., 2010). In other
words, political instability diminishes the utility and returns that MNEs may obtain from investing in political ties, as the in-
tensiﬁcation of political ties can suddenly change from being an asset to a liability in such environments. On the other hand, for MNEs
originating from environments with more stable political institutions, this may not be the case because the intensiﬁcation of ties with
entrenched political actors (and their parties) may provide greater long-term beneﬁts (Bonardi et al., 2005). Naturally, due to
variance in political stability across countries, and the important role of the home country institutions in shaping MNE resource
allocation decisions by inducing external isomorphism to local conditions (Peng et al., 2008), MNEs from diﬀerent home countries
will exhibit heterogeneous inclinations in allocating managerial resources to intensify political ties (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).
What does this mean for foreign subsidiaries? From a neoinstitutional theory perspective, foreign subsidiary strategies are con-
tinuously inﬂuenced by the transference of organizational practices from their parents (Ahlvik and Bjorkman, 2015; Kostova, 1999;
Makino et al., 2004). Kostova and Roth (2002, p. 216) have noted that “there is a within-organization domain that deﬁnes a set of
pressures to which all units within the organization must conform… the organizational pressures within the MNC would require some
degree of compliance.” In fact, “subunits are often more dependent on the parent company than their local external environments for
critical resources…. [Thus, MNEs] are likely to consciously create and strengthen their intraorganizational ﬁeld so as to reinforce and
disseminate a shared business model” (Kostova et al., 2008: p. 998). Consequently, managers of foreign subsidiaries often interpret
their host country operating environment, to an extent, through a lens shaped by parent home country institutions (Holburn and
Zelner, 2010; Oliver, 1997; Pan, 2002).
Because MNEs typically build their core resource base in their home country, home country context can play either an enhancing
or constraining role in foreign subsidiary business activities (Meyer et al., 2011). The transfer of strategic practices associated with
personnel, processes, resource allocation priorities, and, in general, ways of doing business, from the parent's home country to the
subsidiary is common within MNEs (Andersson et al., 2002; Benito et al., 2011). The continuous transference of these practices within
the MNE results in a degree of intra-MNE isomorphism whereby foreign subsidiaries adopt norms originating in the MNE's home
country (Roth & Kostova, 2003). Therefore, due to this dual embeddedness, within the host country and within the MNE, a foreign
subsidiary will be subject to institutional pressures derived at least partially from the parent's home county context (Meyer et al.,
2011; Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002).
Boddewyn (1988) has argued that ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages in the nonmarket arena are related to the political institutions of a
parent's home country because MNEs often transfer political practices which they are accustomed to performing at home to foreign
subsidiaries. Transfers of political practices can be induced or even altogether mandatory, as is the case concerning enforcement of
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Boddewyn, 1988). Hillman and Wan (2005: p. 324) found this to be the case for U.S. based
Fig. 1. Conceptual model.
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MNE political strategies in Western Europe where “simultaneous pressures for foreign subsidiaries to conform to two diﬀerent sets of
[institutional] … pressures” being “both external and internal [in nature] likely … inﬂuence[d] … foreign subsidiary [political]
strategies.” A recent example to consider is the case of J. P. Morgan's foreign subsidiary operations in China where unqualiﬁed
children of key government oﬃcials were hired as investment-bankers for the purpose of gaining political favor so that the ﬁrm
would either obtain or retain lucrative government contracts (BBC News, 2016). This program was eliminated by the ﬁrm's head-
quarters (in the U.S.) following the settlement of a lawsuit with the U.S. Federal Government, essentially altering foreign subsidiary
political practices in China due to political institutions in the MNE's home country.
Accordingly, the MNE's adaptation to home country political conditions and the simultaneous intra-MNE diﬀusion of in-
stitutionalized practices to subsidiaries suggests that decisions made by managers of foreign subsidiaries to allocate eﬀorts towards
political networking will be inﬂuenced by the political institutions in the MNE parent's home country. As the parent develops
strategic practices tailored for home country political institutions, these practices will then be disseminated within the MNE's sub-
sidiary network, aﬀecting the intensity with which foreign subsidiaries engage in political ties in their respective host country
environments (cf. Gamble, 2010).1 Taken together, along with the aforementioned arguments regarding the importance of political
stability as an incentive for increasing the intensity of political tie building, we posit that foreign subsidiaries whose parents are
embedded in home countries that are more politically stable will have a greater propensity to intensify political ties than foreign
subsidiaries with parents from home countries that are more politically unstable. Formally stated:
Hypothesis 1. Greater parent home country political stability will increase a foreign subsidiary's political tie intensity, ceteris
paribus.
2.2. The moderating role of parent resource protection
Host countries, especially emerging markets, often lack eﬀective governance systems to suﬃciently protect foreign subsidiary
property rights (Li, 2005; Roy and Oliver, 2009). For example, Luo (2007: 42) has argued that in emerging markets “[l]ack of
adequate legal protection as perceived by executives increases uncertainty with respect to property rights and legitimate returns,
disturbs fair competition, and permits unaccountability of regulatory agents' behavior”. Further, foreign subsidiaries are often subject
to a wide range of government expropriation hazards that enhance the risk of losing control over critical resources (Faccio, 2006;
Feinberg and Gupta, 2009). Therefore, one of the key tasks for managers of MNEs is the protection of subsidiary resources (e.g., brand
names, R & D, know-how, technology, trademarks, copyrights, patents, hard assets, and ﬁnancials) (Luo, 2001). For example, Apple
has been aggressive in protecting valuable assets of its foreign subsidiaries by attempting to shape opinion in legal arenas concerning
issues such as intellectual property protection and corporate espionage (Casarin, 2015).
The level of an MNE parent's protecting proprietary resources in host countries can vary depending on the strategic goals un-
derlying the investment and the nature of competitive advantage sought by foreign subsidiaries (Beugelsdijk et al., 2017; Luo, 2001).
Benito et al. (2011) suggested that greater interdependence between foreign subsidiaries and their parents creates a bias towards
routines and practices that are tied to home country institutions. Further, Narula (2002) found that subsidiaries which possess
valuable knowledge-based resources will be more heavily integrated into an MNE's network. Such enhanced intra-MNE embedd-
edness enhances an interdependence between foreign subsidiaries and parents, insuring that parents will have monitoring and control
over foreign subsidiary activities. This line of research suggests that increased interdependence between a parent and foreign sub-
sidiary may inﬂuence the application of political practices. For example, Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) demonstrated that there was
greater coordination of political activities when foreign subsidiaries were more integrated with the parent MNE (see also Hillman and
Wan, 2005).
Taken together, prior literature implies there will be greater coordination of political activities between the parent and its foreign
subsidiaries as the MNE prioritizes the need to protect foreign subsidiary resources, integrating subsidiaries more closely with the
parent MNE (cf. Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Accordingly, we posit that the extent of a parent's eﬀorts in protecting foreign
subsidiary resources will enhance the transference of political practices. In other words, higher levels of parent resource protection
will increase integration of the foreign subsidiary nonmarket strategies with the parent MNE's political activities, thus enhancing the
extent to which home country political stability shapes foreign subsidiary allocation of managerial resources to political ties. If the
parent MNE engages in intense political networking in its home country, and at the same time emphasizes the protection of foreign
subsidiary resources, then foreign subsidiary managers will be more inclined to engage in political activities consistent with the intra-
MNE strategic practices. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between parent home country political stability and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity
will be greater for foreign subsidiaries with parents that exhibit higher levels of resource protection.
2.3. Political tie intensity ﬁt and strategic performance
Several empirical studies have found that social capital derived from political ties is positively related to ﬁrm performance
(Acquaah, 2007; Li and Zhang, 2007; Luo and Park, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000; You and Du, 2012), innovation (Wang and Chung,
1 The conceptual model in Appendix A illustrates the intra-MNE transference of nonmarket practices.
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2013; Wu, 2011), government support (Wei et al., 2011), and formation of cross-border strategic alliances (Siegel, 2007). However,
several studies provide evidence that political ties can bring negative outcomes for foreign subsidiaries operating in emerging
markets. For example, Li et al. (2008) discovered that, when compared to domestic ﬁrms, foreign subsidiaries utilizing political ties
exhibited lower performance outcomes. After all, developing and maintaining political ties requires the allocation of substantial time
and eﬀort by senior managers; resources that could have otherwise been allocated to other, perhaps more economically productive
activities. One of the possible drivers of these equivocal results is that this body of research has failed to consider how ﬁt between a
foreign subsidiary parent's home country political institutions and political tie intensity in a host country will inﬂuence performance.
Political ties are particularly relevant to achieving strategic performance objectives. The ﬁt paradigm asserts that strategic per-
formance is a function of the alignment between the ﬁrm's strategic actions and elements surrounding its internal and external
environment (cf. Brouthers et al., 2000). For instance, Brouthers et al. (2003) suggest that ﬁt between MNE asset speciﬁcity, eco-
nomic uncertainty, and entry mode choice enhance subsidiary eﬃciencies, leading to greater satisfaction with strategic performance.
Similarly, Brouthers et al. (2000) found that MNEs that made risk-adjusted changes to perceived environmental uncertainty which ﬁt
with their entry mode choice were more satisﬁed with strategic performance (i.e., achieving pre-set strategic goals and objectives)
than those which did not. Based on the ﬁt paradigm, one of the ways in which foreign subsidiaries may achieve superior strategic
performance is by aligning their strategies with MNE capabilities that can be leveraged abroad (Brouthers, 2002; Venkatraman, 1989;
Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984).
In the context of our study, ﬁt represents the alignment of foreign subsidiary political tie intensity with parent capabilities derived
from home country political institutions. For instance, when a foreign subsidiary from a politically unstable home country (whereby
MNEs are less incentivized to engage in political tie building) chooses not to invest in intensifying political ties (Henisz and Delios,
2004; Sun et al., 2010), but instead focuses on other aspects of its operations, then this would ﬁt better with capabilities “shaped by
home country institutional patterns” (Holburn and Zelner, 2010, p. 1293). Conversely, if the same foreign subsidiary attempts to
intensify political ties in a host country, then there will likely be a strategic misﬁt between its political networking practices and MNE
norms (Ahlvik and Bjorkman, 2015; White et al., 2013; Zajac et al., 2000). Neo-institutional theory suggests that this misﬁt may
hinder the foreign subsidiary's ability to leverage existing MNE political practices in a host country and result in resource mis-
allocation (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Lawton et al., 2013).
Consequently, we argue that ﬁt between parent home country political institutions and level of foreign subsidiary political tie
intensity in a host country will tend to prove more eﬃcient. These eﬃciencies will occur due to the foreign subsidiary staying within
the means of institutionalized practices transferred from the parent MNE (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Zander and Kogut, 1995), eﬃ-
ciencies that may not be matched by host country capability-building eﬀorts (Luo, 2002; Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002).
Additionally, foreign subsidiaries that intensify political ties in alignment with MNE parent home country political institutions may
have more eﬀective relations with headquarters, thereby aﬀecting resource allocations by the parent that support competitive ad-
vantages in a host country. Such ﬁt should allow the foreign subsidiary to leverage existing MNE competencies and thus more likely
achieve strategic objectives. We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. Fit between the intensity of political ties and parent home country political stability will be positively related to
foreign subsidiary strategic performance.
3. Methods
3.1. Sample and data
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey-based study in the Philippines over the course of several months in 2007. The unit
of analysis in our study is the wholly owned foreign subsidiary. The Philippines is an especially ﬁtting host country in relation to our
research question due to its being a primary foreign investment location choice for MNEs operating in Southeast Asia (United Nations,
2007; Heinrich and Konan, 2001). We speciﬁcally targeted wholly owned foreign subsidiaries because they have complete control
over their operations, which mitigates any potential diﬀerences arising from governance characteristics such as access to local partner
capabilities in joint ventures (Hillman and Wan, 2005). The data were drawn from senior executives. Previous studies have shown
that data derived from single respondents can be as valid and reliable as multiple respondents (e.g., Danis et al., 2010; White et al.,
2015). Also, these key informants were highly knowledgeable about their subsidiary strategies (Luo, 2007) and had access to ﬁrm-
speciﬁc data as points of reference (Podsakoﬀ and Organ, 1986).
The initial sample was composed of 540 foreign subsidiaries which were collected from the Foreign Companies in the Philippines
Yearbook (2007). We pre-tested the survey by submitting it to business scholars from both the Philippines and United States, as well
as with managers operating in the Philippines. This served to adjust the wording in the questionnaire. We then collected data by
distributing a questionnaire through multiple ﬁeld visits, which provided access to the right informants, ensured the correct use of
terminology, and helped improve the response rates (Li and Zhang, 2007). In order to reduce social desirability bias, we assured
respondents complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality in an introductory letter from a higher education sponsoring institution. We
received responses from 194 subsidiaries, but thirteen responses were not usable due to missing data. Hence, the ﬁnal response rate
was 33.5%. This response rate was comparable to other studies that have performed similar data collection methods in emerging
markets (e.g., Li and Zhang, 2007). All of the responses came from top managers that were CEOs, managing directors, senior vice
presidents, and regional heads. The majority of respondents (approximately 56%) were local nationals. As can be seen in Table 1, the
foreign subsidiaries in our sample originated from a diverse array of industries and home countries.
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We tested for non-response bias by comparing respondents and non-respondents on their average size (number of employees),
average of years operating in the Philippines, and business sector (manufacturing or service industry). We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two groups (p > 0.05 level). Furthermore, we interviewed 15 randomly selected informants (e.g., Luo,
1999).2 We followed Krishnan et al. (2006), and Luo (1999), and asked respondents to discuss speciﬁc aspects of their subsidiary's
strategic behavior that were included in the survey (e.g., political ties). In comparing the survey and interview responses, we found
strong consistency (Pearson correlations: 0.96–0.83, p < 0.001; Guttman split-half Rs: 0.82–0.71).
3.2. Variables and measurement
3.2.1. Dependent variables
Political tie intensity and strategic performance were operationalized as dependent variables in this study. Political tie intensity was
constructed by drawing on ideas from Danis et al. (2010) and using four items adapted from White et al. (2015). We measured it by
looking at the extent to which the foreign subsidiary used informal ties and connections to (1) political leaders in various levels of
government; (2) regulatory authorities; and (3) commercial administration bureaus over the past three years on a seven-point Likert-
type scale (1 = “very little” to 7 = “very much”). We assessed this also by asking the informants about the extent of time spent by
senior management in engaging with government oﬃcials over the past three years on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “very
low” to 7 = “very high”). These items were then factored analyzed employing principal component analysis with Kaiser normal-
ization using varimax rotation (Cronbach's alpha = 0.80; communality loadings = 0.82–0.60).
Strategic performance was measured by three items adapted from Brouthers et al. (2000, 2003), and Chowdhury (1992): com-
petitive position, market share, and market access. These items are particularly relevant to our study because political ties are usually
thought of as instrumental for achieving strategic performance objectives such as market share and market access. Using the past
three years as a reference point, respondents were asked to rate how satisﬁed they were with their subsidiary's performance in the
aforementioned areas on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “very dissatisﬁed” to 7 = “very satisﬁed”).3 Thereafter, these three
items were factored analyzed using principal component analysis with Kaiser normalization using varimax rotation (Cronbach's
Table 1
Sample characteristics.
Source: White et al. (2015).
Country and region of origin # % Industrya %
(Americas) (54) (30) Agriculture/environmental 1.7
Canada 4 2.2 Banking/ﬁnance/insurance 6.5
Mexico 1 0.6 Chemicals 7.8
U.S.A. 49 27.1 Construction and engineering 8.2
(Asia) (60) (33) Consumer goods 4.3
Japan 45 24.9 Electronics and electrical equipment 10.4
Malaysia 1 0.6 Food and drink 3.9
P.R. China 4 2.2 IT/computers/software 3.0
Singapore 4 2.2 Machinery and heavy equipment 6.9
South Korea 3 1.7 Mining/metals/steel 3.0
(Europe) (62) (34) Motor industry 3.4
Belgium 3 1.7 Oil/gas/energy 2.6
Denmark 3 1.7 Pharmaceuticals and medical care 6.9
Finland 1 0.6 Printing/paper/media 2.1
France 12 6.6 Real estate and property 1.7
Germany 10 5.5 Telecoms/telecommunications 3.9
Netherlands 6 3.3 Textiles 1.3
Norway 2 1.1 Tourism/travel/leisure 1.7
Sweden 2 1.1 Trade 7.4
Switzerland 6 3.3 Transportation 5.2
United Kingdom 17 9.4 Various consultancies 7.4
(Other) (5) (3)
Australia 3 1.7
South Africa 2 1.1
(Total) (181)
a Refers to primary industry of operations.
2 These informants represented a wide range of both expatriates (N= 8) and locals (N= 7) working for foreign subsidiaries from a broad range of industries
(agriculture/environmental = 1, banking/ﬁnance/insurance = 2, construction and engineering = 1, electronics = 2, food and drink = 2, machinery and heavy
equipment = 1, motor industry = 1, oil and gas = 1, telecoms/telecommunication = 1, real estate and property = 1, various consultancies = 2) and countries of
origin (Japan = 3; United States = 3; France 2; Germany = 2; United Kingdom = 2; Malaysia = 1; Singapore = 1; South Korea = 1).
3 Past studies have suggested that subjective measures in emerging markets are eﬀective in capturing speciﬁc aspects of performance largely unavailable in
secondary data (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2003; Luo and Peng, 1999; Park and Luo, 2001). Further, in such contexts “ﬁrms are reluctant to provide objective
measures of performance for their foreign subsidiaries”, as “objective measures of performance may suﬀer from translation errors due to diﬀerences in reporting
practices … and managers tend to judge … success or failure … based on the achievement of pre-set goals and objectives.” (Brouthers, 2013: 6).
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alpha = 0.89; communality loadings = 0.89–0.77).
3.2.2. Predictor variable
Similar to Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) and Hoﬀman et al. (2016), we employed home country political stability from the World
Bank Governance Indicators database. This variable is operationalized at the country-level, measuring the political stability in each
subsidiary's home country for the years 2004–2007 in order to match years with the reﬂective measures employed from our primary
data. According to the World Bank, this item captures perceptions of the likelihood of frequent political changes and turmoil, which is
appropriate given our theoretical arguments. We aggregated the raw score of each country's percentile rank (ranging from 0 to 100)
over the years 2004–2007 and then divided the aggregated score by four. In other words, we captured current political institutional
conditions in each subsidiary's home country by measuring the average home country political stability over the years parallel to the
dependent variables. Further, we ran a principal component analysis with Kaiser normalization (using varimax rotation) between the
items that make-up this variable in order to verify its convergent validity. Items for this variable loaded on a single component.
3.2.3. Moderating variable
Parent resource protection was measured by two items adapted from Luo (2001). We asked informants to rate the extent to which
their foreign subsidiary disagreed or agreed that (1) protecting resources, technologies, or knowledge are imperative to the sub-
sidiary's achievement of the strategic goals underlying investment, and (2) our parent company protects ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources,
technologies, or knowledge it commits to the subsidiary in order to gain greater beneﬁts from such investment, over the past three
years on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”). Thereafter, these items were factored
analyzed using principal component analysis with Kaiser normalization using varimax rotation (Cronbach's alpha = 0.89; com-
munality loadings = 0.85–0.84).
Political tie intensity ﬁt is a dichotomous variable developed from foreign subsidiaries whose political tie intensity was predicted
versus not predicted by home country political stability in a choice model (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2005). Following
Brouthers (2002) and White et al. (2013), we ﬁrst transformed political tie intensity (a continuous variable on a seven point Likert
scale) into a dichotomous dummy variable by performing a median split (high political tie intensity = 1, low political tie in-
tensity = 0). We then ran a logistic regression with foreign subsidiary home country political stability as the independent variable and
the transformed dichotomous variable as the dependent variable. Foreign subsidiaries whose political tie intensity was predicted by
this model (the ﬁt group) were assigned a value of 1 for the political tie intensity ﬁt variable, while foreign subsidiaries whose political
tie intensity was not predicted by this model (the misﬁt group) were assigned a value of 0. The Data Analyses and Results sections
provide further information concerning how this variable was constructed.
3.2.4. Control variables
A number of other theoretically relevant control variables were used. Informant nationality (coded 1 = Filipino, 0 = otherwise)
was used as a control variable due to local and foreign expatriate informants having diﬀerent perceptions of these foreign subsidiary's
operations in this region, which could have created some biases (Luo, 2002; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Informant experience
was operationalized as the number of years that a respondent spent working in the Philippines. We controlled for top management
team size, measured as the number of executives formally managing the subsidiary, since the size of the team can have an eﬀect on
the extent and intensity of political networks. Further, the length of operations in the Philippines can inﬂuence learning and adaption
to a host country (Li and Zhang, 2007; Luo, 1999), hence we controlled for the number of years from initial year of the subsidiary's
establishment in the Philippines. We also controlled for foreign subsidiary size, measured as the total number of full-time employees,
as larger subsidiaries may have more resources at their disposal to carry-out political activities (Brouthers, 2002; Erramilli and Rao,
1993).
Cultural distance could play a role in how successful a foreign subsidiary will be in deploying political connections that enhance
performance (Luo, 2001). Hence, we controlled for cultural distance to the Philippines using Kogut and Singh's (1988) formula based
on Hofstede's (1980) four cultural dimensions. To account for some transaction costs, we add geographic distance, operationalized as
the kilometers between the foreign subsidiary's parent home country and the Philippines (e.g., Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011). Based on
Luo (2007) we accounted for the subsidiary's orientation in the Philippines, as it could aﬀect political engagement. This was captured
as follows: 1 = local market focused, 0 = export-oriented. Finally, we also controlled for potential industry eﬀects by using four
dummy variables: banking and ﬁnance, technology, oil and gas, and manufacturing, as well as by including the industry sales growth
rate (%) of each subsidiary.
In order to check the discriminant validity of our primary data, we conducted Harman's (1967) one-factor test. We observed that
political tie intensity, parent resource protection, and strategic performance yielded three distinct factors with eigenvalues all greater
than one. Neither factor accounted for the majority of variance (highest percentage of variance explained = 31.99%). Additionally,
we performed a conﬁrmatory factor analysis on all items related to the three latent variables. There was a signiﬁcant improvement in
the chi-square statistic from the single factor model establishing better model ﬁt for the multiple factor model (p < 0.01), which also
substantiates that common method bias is not a serious problem in our data.
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4. Data analysis and results
4.1. Tests of hypotheses
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coeﬃcients among all variables in this study. The variance
inﬂation factors (VIFs) for all variables were well under 10, showing that multicollinearity is not an issue (Hair et al., 1998).
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we performed a moderated hierarchical multiple regression analysis; Table 3 presents these results.
Hypothesis 1 stated our prediction that greater home country political stability will enhance foreign subsidiary political tie intensity.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (β= 0.17, p < 0.05) in Model 2 indicates that parent home country political stability is
positively related to foreign subsidiary host country political tie intensity, supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the
positive relationship between parent home country political stability and political tie intensity will be stronger for foreign sub-
sidiaries with parents that exhibit high levels of resource protection. The interaction term between parent home country political
stability and parent resource control in Model 4 had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on foreign subsidiary political tie intensity
(β= 0.15, p < 0.05), supporting Hypothesis 2. Overall, Model ﬁt (change in F) and variance explained (change in R2) signiﬁcantly
improved from model to model.
To further validate and gain insight into the nature of the moderation eﬀect, we plotted the interaction where parent resource
control was treated as a contingency variable aﬀecting the relationship between parent home country political stability and foreign
subsidiary political tie intensity. We relied on mean scores and a range of one negative to one positive standard deviation (Aiken and
West, 1991). As can be seen in Fig. 2, foreign subsidiary home country political stability has a stronger eﬀect (steeper slope) on
political tie intensity when there are higher levels of parent resource control, in line with Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, the plot suggests
that the eﬀect of home country political stability on political tie intensity is apparent mostly when resource protection is relatively
higher; when resource protection is lower than the mean, the slope is decreasingly positive and may even be virtually ﬂat.
We then used a two-stage technique described in Shaver (1998) and adopted by numerous studies (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers
et al., 2005; White et al., 2013). In stage one, a dichotomous dummy variable, named political tie intensity ﬁt, was created from the
foreign subsidiaries whose political tie intensity was correctly classiﬁed or not by a choice of political tie intensity model as described
Table 3
Results of moderated hierarchical regression analyses.a,b
Political tie intensity
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Control variables
Informant home country −0.02 (−0.19) −0.01 (−0.08) −0.01 (−0.12) −0.02 (−0.17)
Informant experience −0.03 (−0.28) −0.03 (−0.27) −0.03 (−0.27) −0.01 (−0.06)
Top management team size −0.06 (−1.01) −0.06 (−0.86) −0.06 (−0.98) −0.07 (−1.03)
Foreign subsidiary experience −0.01 (−0.01) 0.02 (0.24) 0.03 (0.32) 0.03 (0.43)
Foreign subsidiary size −0.03 (−0.35) −0.03 (−0.38) −0.04 (−0.47) −0.06 (−0.77)
Cultural distance −0.16 (−2.28)⁎ −0.07 (−0.69) −0.06 (−0.66) −0.04 (−0.36)
Geographic distance −0.24 (−2.62)⁎⁎ −0.22 (−2.28)⁎ −0.21 (−2.29)⁎ −0.17 (−1.82)
Market orientation −0.09 (−1.10) −0.06 (−0.82) −0.04 (−0.52) −0.04 (−0.50)
Industry growth rate −0.13 (−1.77)† −0.14 (−1.92)† −0.13 (−1.76)† −0.15 (−1.99)⁎
Banking & ﬁnance −0.21 (−2.74)⁎⁎ −0.23 (−3.01)⁎⁎ −0.23 (−3.03)⁎⁎ −0.23 (−2.97)⁎⁎
Technology 0.06 (0.88) 0.07 (0.95) 0.08 (1.11) 0.09 (1.25)†
Oil & gas 0.15 (2.19)⁎ 0.15 (2.10)⁎ 0.13 (1.82)† 0.14 (1.96)⁎
Manufacturing 0.24 (3.08)⁎⁎ 0.20 (2.58)⁎⁎ 0.22 (2.86)⁎⁎ 0.23 (2.97)⁎⁎
Predictor variables
HC political stability (HCPS)c 0.17 (2.13)⁎ 0.18 (2.25)⁎ 0.16 (2.14)⁎
Parent resource protection (PRP)c 0.12 (1.75)† 0.12 (1.76)†
Interaction
HCPS × PRP 0.15 (1.99)⁎
R2 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.40
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.35
Change in R2 0.02⁎ 0.01† 0.02⁎
Change in F 4.53⁎ 3.13† 3.99⁎
Model df 167 166 165 164
t-Values in parentheses.
† p < 0.10.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01 (two-tailed signiﬁcance tests).
a N= 181. Values represent standardized coeﬃcients (βs) with corresponding.
b The highest VIF value in Model 3 is 2.80.
c HC = home country. Centered variables.
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above (see generally Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2005). Next, foreign subsidiaries whose level of political tie intensity was
predicted by this model (the ﬁt group) were assigned a value of 1 for the political tie intensity ﬁt dummy variable, while foreign
subsidiaries whose political tie intensity was not predicted by this model (the non-ﬁt group) were assigned a value of 0. Table 4
Fig. 2. The moderating role of parent resource protection.
Table 4
Logistic regression: Political tie intensity choice model.
Parameter Β Exp(β) Wald S.E.
Predictor:
HC Political stabilitya 0.01⁎ 1.01 4.18 0.01
Controls:
Parent resource protection 0.05† 1.04 2.85 0.02
Informant home country −0.69 0.50 1.33 0.02
Informant experience −0.01 0.99 0.01 0.04
Top management team size −0.02 0.98 0.02 0.14
Foreign subsidiary experience −0.02† 0.98 3.16 0.01
Foreign subsidiary size 0.01 1.00 0.61 0.01
Cultural distance −0.01 0.99 0.93 0.01
Geographic distance 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.01
Market orientation 0.70† 0.48 2.20 0.49
Industry growth −0.04† 0.96 3.59 0.02
Banking & ﬁnance −0.23 0.80 0.14 0.59
Technology 0.57 1.78 1.30 0.51
Oil & gas 0.82† 2.28 2.79 0.49
Manufacturing 0.39 1.48 0.87 0.42
Constant 1.61† 5.02 3.11 0.91
N 181
Chi square 59.48⁎⁎ `
Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.29
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.39
Percent correctly classiﬁed 73.60
Df 15
N= 181. Values represent unstandardized coeﬃcients (βs).
β= logistic regression parameter estimate. Exp(β) = odds ratio.
† p < 0.10.
a HC = home country.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01 (two-tailed signiﬁcance tests).
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presents these results.
In stage two, we conducted a second moderated hierarchical multiple regression analysis; Table 5 presents these results.
Hypothesis 3 stated that political tie intensity ﬁt will be positively related to foreign subsidiary strategic performance. The positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (β= 0.38, p < 0.01) in Model 2 indicates that political tie intensity ﬁt is positively related to foreign
subsidiary strategic performance, supporting Hypothesis 3. As with our ﬁrst analysis, model ﬁt (change in F) and change in variance
explained (change in R2) signiﬁcantly improved from model to model. In each of the regression models, variance inﬂation factors
(VIFs) were examined to identify potential multicollinearity. All VIF scores were well below the 10.00 threshold with the highest one
being 2.80 (Table 3, Model 4), suggesting that multicollinearity was not a major concern (Hair et al., 1998).
Finally, in order to conﬁrm the robustness of our results, we ran sensitivity checks concerning foreign subsidiary parent home
countries (Gu and Lu, 2011). We conducted a series of analyses parallel to what is reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5, after removing
observations of foreign subsidiaries with parents from the U.S.A. and Japan—the two largest parent home countries in the sample. We
also ran a sensitivity check by employing multilevel modeling to further account for nested data. Our results running linear mixed
models showed consistent results to the ﬁndings oﬀered in our OLS hierarchical regression analyses in Table 3. The estimates for the
relationship between the predictor variables home country political stability (p < 0.05) and parent resource protection (p < 0.10),
as well as the estimate for the interaction term (p < 0.05), were positive and signiﬁcantly related to political tie intensity. In
summary, our sensitivity check ﬁndings were similar to our reported results in terms of signiﬁcance, magnitude, and direction,
providing evidence for the robustness of the original results.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our objectives for this study were to extend theory in the international nonmarket strategy literature by advancing understanding
of the antecedents and outcomes of foreign subsidiary political tie intensity. Drawing from neoinstitutional theory and the ﬁt
paradigm, we have theorized and empirically demonstrated that the intensity of foreign subsidiary political ties is aﬀected by po-
litical stability in a MNE parent's home country, particularly when the parent exhibits high levels of resource protection. Our results
Table 5
Results of moderated hierarchical regression analyses.a,b
Strategic performance
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
Informant home country 0.11 (1.03) 0.13 (1.37)
Informant experience −0.08 (−0.76) −0.07 (−0.65)
Top management team size −0.02 (−0.28) −0.03 (−0.53)
Foreign subsidiary experience 0.16 (2.00)⁎ 0.19 (2.59)⁎⁎
Foreign subsidiary size −0.01 (−0.07) −0.05 (−0.68)
Cultural distance −0.03 (−0.30) 0.03 (−0.38)
Geographic distance −0.16 (−1.57)† −0.16 (−1.66)†
Market orientation −0.03 (−0.33) −0.01 (−0.04)
Industry growth rate 0.03 (0.41) 0.05 (0.65)
Banking & ﬁnance −0.20 (−2.53)⁎⁎ −0.16 (−2.22)⁎
Technology −0.01 (−0.20) −0.02 (−0.28)
Oil & gas 0.16 (2.21)⁎ 0.13 (1.82)†
Manufacturing 0.08 (0.97) 0.11 (1.50)
Political tie intensity 0.37 (4.46)⁎⁎ 0.15 (1.68)†
Predictor variable
Political tie intensity ﬁt 0.38 (4.63)⁎⁎
R2 0.34 0.42
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.36
Change in R2 0.08⁎⁎
Change in F 21.46⁎⁎
Model df 166 165
t-Values in parentheses.
† p < 0.10.
a N= 181. Values represent standardized coeﬃcients (βs) with corresponding.
b The highest VIF value in Model 2 is 2.78.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01 (two-tailed signiﬁcance tests).
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also show that the ﬁt between parent home country political stability and a foreign subsidiary's political tie intensity will positively
inﬂuence strategic performance. Foreign subsidiaries with parents from politically stable home countries may achieve better strategic
performance outcomes when they allocate greater managerial resources to intensifying political ties. Otherwise, it may be better for
these foreign subsidiaries to leverage other, non-political, capabilities to enhance strategic performance outcomes. While the culti-
vation of political ties has many beneﬁts, these nonmarket activities may represent a divergence of attention and resources away from
their intended purpose, which can cause ineﬃciencies for certain foreign subsidiaries.
Our study answers calls made by Lux et al. (2011) and Mellahi et al. (2016) in addressing two important gaps in the international
nonmarket strategy literature. First, through the application of neoinstitutional theory, we shed light on how the transference of
strategic practices associated with MNE parent home country political institutions—through external and subsequently intra-MNE
adaptation—may inﬂuence foreign subsidiary political networking activities in host country environments. While prior literature has
focused on the utility of political ties across ﬁrms, we have focused on home country political institutions and parent resource
protection as drivers of political tie intensity. Our approach adds novel antecedents to the nomological network of political ties, thus
contributing to the theory of why managers of foreign subsidiaries decide to engage more intensely in political tie building activities.
Interestingly, results regarding parent resource protection suggest that MNE global strategy pertaining to subsidiary autonomy and
resource control may, intentionally or not, aﬀect nonmarket strategy decisions and outcomes as well. Therefore, the interaction of
market and nonmarket strategy requires more attention within the international nonmarket strategy literature.
Second, prior studies have shown that the adaptation of political ties to host country operating environments oﬀers positive
performance outcomes (Acquaah, 2007; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000), yet overly embedded political networks in host
countries can have negative performance outcomes (e.g., Sun et al., 2010). However, these studies have not taken into account the
transference of MNE parent organizational practices. We oﬀer evidence that foreign subsidiary performance outcomes are at least
partially determined by ﬁt between political institutions at home and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity abroad. This ﬁnding
helps disentangle some of the equivocal existing evidence regarding the utility of political ties in emerging economies by suggesting
that a foreign subsidiary's leveraging of a parent's organizational practices, such as those underlying its political capabilities, may
support the achievement of strategic objectives in a host country. Our examination of subsidiaries operating within the same host
country allows us to evaluate whether or not nonmarket strategic decisions made by managers—that are in alignment with parent
MNE practices tied to home country institutional conditions—matter to a foreign subsidiary's success in a host country. Such drivers
of political tie intensity and foreign subsidiary eﬀectiveness are novel additions to institutional theory and the international non-
market strategy literature.
Like all studies, this paper has some limitations which oﬀer opportunities for future research. First, subjective measures of
political tie intensity and strategic performance employed in this study permitted us to capture the richness of political network
relationships as they relate to ﬁt with parent home country institutional conditions, as well as allowing for a ﬁne-grained analysis of
their impact on strategic performance. However, the use of key informant self-report data may pose potential problems such as the
limited recall of informants and biased perceptions of past actualities. Nonetheless, the choice of using perceptual measures was
necessary due to the diﬃculty in getting objective data for the focal constructs, especially among foreign subsidiaries operating in the
Philippines. Second, the cross-sectional nature of our dataset allows us to capture a moment in time, sacriﬁcing the ability to gauge
the causal relationships over time. Third, the empirical setting of this study was a single country, which can help to control for host
country environmental factors, but we do not know how context-speciﬁc the level of political tie intensity may be. Thus, a more
comprehensive assessment of these relationships via a comparative analysis across multiple host countries is warranted.
This study oﬀers several other avenues for future research. While we have focused on foreign subsidiary political tie intensity,
future research in this area may focus on other aspects of nonmarket strategy such as political network targets. An essential issue
confronting foreign subsidiaries is whether their political targets are optimally sequenced. A focus on political targets calls for a more
nuanced perspective on which political actors and foreign subsidiaries develop relationships at both the local and national levels in
terms of tie intensity, as well as how home country political conditions aﬀect the target portfolio. It would be particularly interesting
to further investigate how these relationships speciﬁcally apply to emerging market MNE's internationalizing into both developed and
developing host country environments.
Our ﬁndings also warrant further investigation into how other elements of an MNE's home country institutional context inﬂuence
political networking practices abroad. For example, our results demonstrate that MNEs do carry “institutional baggage” in inter-
national operations (Roth and Kostova, 2003). With this in mind, more can be done to investigate the phenomenon such as
knowledge transfer and the eﬀects of ﬁt between foreign subsidiary adaptation to local institutions versus alignment of MNE parent
nonmarket practices in their home country environments.
Finally, we found that foreign subsidiaries operating in growing industries, such as the banking and ﬁnancial services sector, are
less inclined to pursue intensive political networking activities. This ﬁnding alludes to the notion that foreign subsidiaries operating
in rapidly growing industries may have less of a need to intensify political ties, or perhaps the nature of how these subsidiaries are
regulated may constrain such political activities (Lawton et al., 2012). Future research could examine whether task environment
factors act as complements or substitutes as to the allocation of resources towards political networking activities. In conclusion, we
believe that this study provides novel theoretical insights to international nonmarket strategy research investigating political net-
working practices of MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries.
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